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This article explores how welfare clients use and experience the fair
hearing system, the administrative mechanism for challenging denials or
reductions of aid in public welfare bureaucracies. Drawing on data from
in-depth interviews with clients, it explores how old-style procedural
protections like fair hearings are being used to challenge new-style welfare
reforms. This research found that clients use fair hearings as a form of
resistance and self-assertion, hoping that it will protect them from a
bureaucracy perceived as arbitrary and capricious. Like many citizens, they
are as concerned with being heard by their governmental institutions as
they are with the outcome of their case and want to find within the machinery
of government a forum where they can obtain recompense and respect.
However, the legalistic and rule-bound nature of hearings makes it difficult
for clients to present their claims, and meaningful participation is often
denied them.
 
“There are two types of people. There’s welfare people and there’s regular
people. You are now welfare people. You do as we say, you work when we
say work, you don’t have the privileges you used to have.” These are the





 For Laura, and others like her, these words bluntly
encapsulate the stigma, scrutiny, and control that characterize their daily
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and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, referred to hereafter as
welfare reform, solidified and expanded. In an act both symbolical and
practical, the law declared that welfare was no longer an entitlement, while
dramatically intensifying rules requiring work. Welfare reform thus completed
and codified the evolution of welfare over the last few decades from a
government guarantee of aid to government largesse granted only to those
who can demonstrate their moral worthiness through work.
One of the few vestiges of the old system of rights is administrative
“fair hearings,” which can be initiated by clients to challenge denials,
discontinuances, or reductions of aid. Scholars have criticized hearings in
the past as ineffectually legalistic and rule-bound as the system, whose errors
it was designed to correct (White 1990; Simon 1983; Mashaw 1973). None-
theless it is one of the few spaces within the welfare system where clients
can challenge the regime of rules under which they live. Through open-ended
in-depth interviews with clients of a suburban welfare agency, this study
explores what they think of the fair hearing system, how they make sense
of it, and how they use it. It also examines how clients resist welfare reform’s
new commands, including its surveillance and control of their personal
and work behavior, by using the bureaucracy’s procedural mechanisms for




For the welfare poor “the law is all over” (Sarat 1990, 343). Welfare
law and regulations control when and how welfare recipients’ basic needs
will be met. Need is determined by standardized mathematical formulas
derived from the law, and the procedures for applying and receiving welfare
are tightly scripted by legal rules and practices. Thus, while worker’s exercise
discretion alongside the law, the law guides much of what they do. Decisions
that for others are private, such as when and where to work, and for how
many hours each week, are controlled and circumscribed by the law. Thus,
for welfare clients, the law looms large in everyday activities and decisions.
Law has been viewed as both protective and destructive to the poor.
In the first three decades of Aid to Dependent Children (ADC), while rules
guided the administration of benefits, the discretionary social work model
was emphasized, and caseworkers had considerable latitude in parceling out
benefits (Simon 1983). This approach was criticized in the 1960s as damaging,
and even insulting, to the poor (Simon 1983; Bane and Ellwood 1994). It
invited bias and prejudice, and subjected the poor to intrusive questions when
they needed cash assistance, not social work. Influenced by the civil rights
movement, which viewed law as a powerful and effective instrument of
protection for disenfranchised groups, advocates argued that welfare
recipients, no less than other citizens, should be protected by the law (Reich






 Rules replaced more discretionary judgments, and individualized
grants were supplanted by a uniform schedule. These rules, it was thought,
would constrain worker bias and ensure fairness and equity.
With the greater emphasis on rules came a greater emphasis on legal
mechanisms, such as fair hearings, to correct their misapplication. Advocates
argued that the poor needed more powerful legal tools and procedures to
challenge workers who misapplied the rules. Organizations, such as the
National Welfare Rights Organization, also viewed hearings as a tactical tool
for system-wide change (Kornbluh 2007). They encouraged the mass filing
of appeals to disrupt the system and to publicize their demand for adequate
welfare benefits. Activist lawyers turned to the courts to make hearings, which
have been required by statute in some form since the ADC’s inception in
1935, more accessible to clients.





 (1970) held that hearings must be provided before the termination
of benefits. The Court specified what such hearings should entail, importing
many of the traditional features of rights-based procedural justice, including
notice, an opportunity to be heard before a neutral decisionmaker, and
the right to cross-examine witnesses. Consistent with a rights-based model,
the response to a new welfare regime increasingly dominated by rules was






 Court also recognized that “the opportunity to be heard must
be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard”
(268–69). Scholars have questioned whether traditional procedural due
process protections are effective for disenfranchised groups. White argues that
while a hearing may provide “all the rituals of due process” (1990, 32), it
does little to alter welfare’s substantive terms, leaving clients economically
vulnerable and hence hesitant to complain because they fear retaliation. The
suspicion that hovers over welfare recipients makes silence and discreetness
more likely than complaining (see also Gilliom 2001; Handler 1986; Soss
2002). According to White, those who do speak up will not be heard, because
their stories are at odds with a bureaucracy that has reduced complex human
needs to a legalistic formula. Hearings demand administrative and legal
specificity, leaving little room for clients’ pleas and the realities of their lives.
Clients are more likely to give a relational account that emphasizes social
need and entitlement, rather than the preferred rule-orientated account
(Conley and O’Barr 1990). In short, procedural justice means more than
having an opportunity to speak, but also to be understood, which fair hearings
cannot ensure.
 
2. It was not only liberals who argued for the change. Conservatives argued that rules
and standardized formulas would make it more difficult for caseworkers to provide generous
benefits (Bane and Ellwood 1994).
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Bumiller (1987), in her study of victims of discrimination, echoes these
concerns, noting that legal channels for resolving complaints are often
avoided by victims. Some refuse to define the problem as legal, instead
blaming themselves, or viewing it as an experience to survive and not a legal
problem to resolve. Complaining risks making things worse or not any better.
It means accepting the label of victim, thus reproducing, in a legal forum,
feelings of powerlessness and isolation. As in the welfare context, legal forums
replicate asymmetrical power relationships rather than leveling them.
Sarat stresses that there are spaces within the law that can be used to
resist it. In describing the legal consciousness of the welfare poor based on
interviews with clients who had sought legal assistance for their welfare
problems, Sarat illustrates how clients learn to assert their needs despite their
powerlessness. Clients play with the rules, using their insider knowledge of the
system to resist the unreasonable and the arbitrary. Clients use the law, and legal
assistance, as a “way of individualizing and humanizing the welfare bureaucracy”
(Sarat 1990, 363). Asserting a complaint is not just a legal act but a willing
of visibility. It is a way of exposing the irrationality of a rationally ordered
bureaucracy whose purpose is to help but which frequently fails to do so.
For the marginalized and the powerlessness, “standing against the law”
is a way to overcome its power, if even just a bit (Ewick and Silbey 1998,
165). As Ewick and Sibley describe, while this sometimes may mean laying
low, and trying to avoid the law’s grasp, it often means engaging and
subverting the bureaucratic structures in which public power is ensconced. It
is an unscripted resistance that takes advantage of leaks in the organizational
structure. It employs its tools against it, for example exposing the bureaucracy’s
failure to follow its own rules or looking for cracks within the rules. Sometimes
the resistance can take on a decidedly overt tone. Instead of avoiding conflict,
resisters may generate complaints, “leapfrogging over layers of the bureaucratic
hierarchy” (211) so as to subvert that hierarchy, “converting [complaints]
from an individual into an organizational problem” (213).
For welfare recipients, the need to resist, and complain, has grown even
stronger. As Sarat noted in 1990, “During the last decade welfare eligibility
standards have been made more stringent, and a continuous process of reporting
and review was put into place. Law’s hard, bureaucratic face has supplemented,
if not altogether replaced, its right-protecting concerns” (344). Welfare
reform legislation, passed six years after Sarat’s observation, has completed
the transformation, officially signaling that the era of rights is over. Subject
now to an all-enveloping system that monitors their personal behavior, clients




3. States are still required “to provide opportunities for recipients who have been adversely
affected to be heard in a state administrative proceeding” (42 U.S.C. Sec. 402). Moreover,
despite statutory language eliminating welfare as an entitlement, recipients may still retain a property
interest in welfare, and hence hearings may be constitutionally required as well (Scanlan 1998).
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Although fair hearings are a fixed feature of the welfare bureaucracy,
few studies have explored clients’ experiences at fair hearings, either before





were primarily quantitative, focusing on appeal rates and outcomes (see
Hammer and Hartley 1978; Baum 1974; Handler 1969; Bell and Norvell
1967). White (1990) and Miller and Holstein (1996) are among the few
scholars who have explored fair hearings qualitatively: White through relating
the story of Mrs. G., a client she represented at a fair hearing, and Miller
and Holstein through an ethnographic field study of dispute processing in
the now defunct Work Incentive Program. Thus, there is very little empirical
data on clients’ actual experiences with the fair hearing system and none
at all on how old-style procedural protections like fair hearings are being





This study is part of a larger study that explored the emergence
(or nonemergence) of formal disputes in welfare bureaucracies through
qualitative semistructured interviews with clients who had been sanctioned




 The original study examined what motivates or
inhibits clients from appealing adverse agency actions. Two groups of clients
were interviewed: those who had appealed their sanction through the
fair hearing system, and those who had not. In all, thirty-four clients were
interviewed. The focus of this article is on the twenty clients who chose to
challenge the welfare system through fair hearings.
Initial field research focused on sanctioned clients, because sanctions
embody a particularly punitive aspect of welfare reform that starkly highlights
issues of power and resistance. Unlike other kinds of less visible or traceable
bureaucratic actions, sanctions are direct and blunt. They provide fertile
ground for exploring how fair hearings are being used in the context of welfare
reform’s harsher features. In the course of field work, it became clear that
clients’ fair hearing use is fluid and complex; the same client who failed to
appeal a sanction would readily appeal other adverse actions. The study was
expanded to explore this and to provide contrasting stories of resistance
beyond sanctions. Thus, additional clients were recruited during the study
who used the fair hearing system other than for appealing sanctions.
 
4. Sanctions are financial penalties imposed on clients who violate the work rules. The
penalties range from a partial reduction to a total loss of the grant, depending on the state.
In New York, sanctions result in a grant reduction equal to the sanctioned individual’s pro
rata share. The first noncompliance results in a one-month grant reduction, and the second
and third result in three and six months, respectively. For a full discussion of sanctions under
welfare reform, see Lens 2006.
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An exploratory qualitative research design was used, because, as noted
above, there is very little empirical data on clients’ actual experiences with
the fair hearing system. In-depth interviews were chosen, because they
allowed clients to use their own words to emphasize what aspects of their
experience were most important to them.
Clients were drawn from a public welfare agency in Suffolk County,
New York, a suburban county located in the metropolitan area surrounding
New York City. Clients were recruited through the county’s primary legal
services office for low-income clients and through various social service
agencies that provided housing, employment, and crisis intervention services.
Referrals were also made by a nonprofit agency that had a contract with
the local Department of Social Services (DSS) to assist sanctioned clients
in Suffolk County to come into compliance with the work rules. Recruitment
flyers were also distributed at various other social service agencies located
throughout Suffolk County. Finally, clients who participated in the study
recruited family and friends. Of the twenty clients interviewed, ten were
African American, eight were white, and two were Hispanic. The average
age was thirty-eight. Fifteen of the clients had families with children, and




All but two of the clients were interviewed in their homes to ensure
privacy and confidentiality and to create a more relaxed environment




 Interviews lasted approximately an hour
and a half and clients were paid $25.00 for their participation. All of the
clients agreed to be tape recorded. Clients were asked a series of open-ended
questions that explored their general experiences with applying for and
receiving welfare, the particular incident that generated their request for a
fair hearing, and their perceptions and experiences of the fair hearing system.
To get as broad a view as possible of clients’ views of the system and their
place in it, clients were also asked about welfare reform and welfare policy
in general.
Each interview was transcribed verbatim. Data analysis began with a
review of each transcript as a whole. On the first read, I identified major
themes and noted them in the margins of the pages. I then used Hyperresearch,
a computer software program designed for the analysis of qualitative data,
to code each transcript. I began with an open-coding approach, first locating
descriptive themes (Strauss 1987). After coding each transcript, I generated
a copy of the coded excerpts, reread and recoded it, grouping descriptive
themes into clusters, and identifying overarching themes within a single case
(Miles and Huberman 1984). After coding all of the transcripts, I reduced
 
5. In New York State, single and/or childless adults are eligible for public assistance under
the state’s safety net program.
6. These clients were interviewed in the offices of the nonprofit housing agency that
recruited the clients for the study.
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the codes into thematic clusters and compiled in one place the excerpts across
cases that reflected these major themes. To make sure that I had preserved
the context appropriately, I then reread each transcript and prepared a
several-page summary that included a synopsis of key events and selected
excerpts that best reflected the major themes I had identified. I also looked
to see if the themes identified in individual cases and across cases matched
the patterns I expected to find based on the literature review. Thus, coding
was a recursive process, where I moved back and forth from an inductive
to a deductive approach and from segmented descriptive codes to major




One limitation of this study, shared with all qualitative studies, is that
by their very nature, they are primarily limited to the sites being studied.
This study is limited to the fair hearing system in one county in New York
State. Its applicability to other counties within the state is limited. Although
the state administers the fair hearing system, individual county practices
regarding fair hearings vary; thus fair hearings are not uniform across the
state. On the other hand, this study also took place in a county similar to
other counties outside New York City, where 75 percent of clients who
proceed to a hearing lose (Lens 2005). It thus offers some insights into clients’
experiences with a system that rarely provides the relief they are seeking
and, which may hence be applicable to other counties with similar low success
rates. Its applicability to other states is limited, as there are wide variations




Of initial interest is why clients use the fair hearing system. As studies
from past decades have demonstrated, appealing is a rare act, with less than
1 percent of clients appealing, although appeal rates have reached as high
as 10 or even 20 percent in certain urban areas (Hammer and Hartley 1978;
Baum 1974; Handler 1969; Bell and Norvell 1967). The most recent study
of appeal rates based on state administrative data, conducted by this author,
found rates still in the 1 percent or less range, but also higher (6.8 percent)
in urban areas, such as New York City (Lens 2005). Thus, for the vast majority
of clients, the fair hearing system remains an unused and perhaps not thought
of bureaucratic option.
While this researcher (forthcoming) has in previous publications explored
why clients do not appeal, some discussion of this here provides a helpful
contrast to why some do. Most clients who do not appeal express a profound
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skepticism that fair hearings would not be any different, in form and
substance, from their ongoing and negative interactions with caseworkers.
They view hearings as an extension of the agency, not an instrument for
challenging it. As noted above, a rights-based model of law rarely puts victims
on an equal footing with their powerful adversaries (Bumiller 1987; White
1990). Thus, the powerlessness, silencing, and subordination that characterize
their everyday interactions with the bureaucracy would, they believe, only
be replicated in the fair hearing room. And unlike most of the rules
surrounding and controlling clients, fair hearings are voluntary. Avoiding
them is thus common sense.
The subsample of clients who did appeal, and reported about here,
put more stock in fair hearings, viewing them as a way to break their
subordination and silence, or to short-circuit or resist the rules. Unlike those
who did not appeal, they had adapted different strategies for surviving the
bureaucracy that incorporated fair hearings. Despite a common perception
that welfare clients are more alike than unlike, those strategies varied among





 For some, fair hearings were used as a way to emphasize need
over rules; for others fair hearings were a piece in a game played to outwit
the welfare bureaucracy. For still others, fair hearings were a tool of resistance,
often played like a game, but more rebelliously. For nearly all of the clients,
including the very few who were successful, fair hearings were often a trying




Yet, despite this, they persisted with their claims.
 
PLEADING NEED OVER RULES
 
For several clients, fair hearings were used to assert needs that had been
denied or ignored. Ellen, who was interviewed prior to her hearing, is an
example. Like virtually every client interviewed, she was acutely attuned to
the degradation and stigmatization common in welfare bureaucracies
(Anderson, Halter, and Gryzlak 2004; Miller 2003; Soss 2002). When asked
 
7. Legal consciousness is how people experience the law, or “how law constitutes everyday
life and its common problems” (Marshall and Barclay 2003, 619). Instead of an instrumental
approach that examines laws affects on individuals behavior, legal consciousness studies examine
how “people come to terms with use, or ignore law as they construct their own local universe
of legal values and behavior” (Sarat and Kearns 1998, 60). This study falls squarely in the
tradition of legal consciousness studies by exploring, through their own words, how welfare
recipients use, think of, and view the fair hearing system in their everyday transactions with
the welfare bureaucracy.
8. The exact percentage of hearings won by clients could not be calculated, as several
clients had multiple hearings over the years, the outcomes of which they could not always
clearly recall, or which they did not know at the time of the interview. Overall, and consistent
with the low success rate in Suffolk County, most of the clients reported unfavorable outcomes.
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how she was treated at the agency, she responded “like I was the bottom




 She described her first interview for aid, when she was
nineteen, pregnant, and homeless as “horrible . . . I’m surprised they didn’t
take a sample of my blood. I mean they basically want every single thing.”
Controlled and hemmed in by the rules, Ellen was equally wary of
what she called the “guidelines” or individual worker’s discretion. It was the
“guidelines” she explained, but not a rule, which required her to have three
different forms to prove a fact of eligibility, while eligibility itself was
determined by a rule. And it was the “guidelines” that made it possible for
her worker to send her “to emergency housing somewhere where there’s
crack heads, and prostitutes, and not a good environment for a pregnant
person . . . like a church organization, or a shelter for girls.”
However, despite her evident frustration with both the rules and their
discretionary application, Ellen saw fair hearings as a recourse when she was
discontinued from aid because of “excess income.” She was cut off from benefits
when she obtained a job that put her above the agency’s financial eligibility
level. She did not earn enough to pay her expenses, including her rent and the
daycare she needed to work. If she worked a few hours less a week, or for less
money, she would have remained eligible for crucial benefits, including child
care, health care, and a rent subsidy. To Ellen this made no sense; she wanted
to work, and the agency wanted her, and even required her, to work. Ellen
construed the agency’s decision not as a neutral act, but more personally.
As Ellen explained, the agency “wanted her to stay at poverty. . . . They
want you to stay, when you’re not going anywhere. And that’s not me. I’m
twenty-two, I’m still young. I’ve got the opportunity to make all my dreams
come true. . . . They seem like they’ve got too much control over my life.”
Ellen believed that the hearing officer had the power to exempt her
from the rules, particularly because she was trying so hard to play by them
and become self-sufficient. Here she describes how she will approach the
fair hearing and what she hopes will happen:
Ellen: I’m just gonna explain to them, I have all the paperwork that
they sent me in the mail, I have all my pay stubs that I got from my
last job and I’m just gonna explain to them, I’m like, “this is ridiculous,
I’m working, doing what I got to do,” and I’m gonna give them a
breakdown, I don’t care if you count before taxes, this is how much I
was bringing home a week, this is how much I made in that month
that I was working there. How was I supposed to pay this, this, this,
this, this and this off of that salary?
Interviewer: What do you expect to happen when you tell them this
at the hearing?
 
9. Some quotations were edited for brevity and readability.
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Ellen: I’m expecting them, hopefully in my situation they can, should
be able to do a case-by-case basis, instead of having guidelines and rules
for everyone, like everyone’s in the same situation. I feel in my, in my
case, they should make an—you know, it different for me, “Okay, if you’re
making $10.00 an hour, you don’t have to pay all your rent, pay half,
we’ll still pay your child care for six months until you can save your
money.” Or something like that, like give me a little help, don’t just
cut me off so I have to go back on it again. I’m trying to get off of it,
you should continue to give me that help to get off of it, instead of
having to fall back on it.
For Ellen, the hearing room was a space where she would explain the real-
ties of her life, backed up with written documentation (“I have all the
paperwork . . . I have all my pay stubs”) that she knows are the currency
of the bureaucracy. She reified the fair hearing officer, imbuing her with the
power to disregard the rules, and hear her directly, without the rule’s
mediating influence. She would appeal not to law but to common sense:
“you should continue to give me that help to get off of it, instead of having
to fall back on it.” She would even negotiate a bit, limiting her plea for
help: “for six months until [I] can save [my] money.” If she explained all
this, she thought, an exception could be made for her—her individual needs
recognized.
As Sarat observed, for some clients, getting legal assistance for their
problems with welfare is a way of being noticed and heard. For Ellen, hearings,
like legal assistance, served a similar function. She used her “opportunity to
be heard” to go beyond the procedural and substantive confines of the law.
Instead she reached around the law to make a rational appeal based on the




Several clients worked with the law instead of around it, viewing
hearings as a tactical encounter where the agency could sometimes be
outwitted. As Ewick and Sibley (1998) describe, even in a rule-bound
bureaucracy, legality can be experienced as a game, as individuals search
for ways to use the law to assert their needs. Law is always shadowing
them but so too is the possibility that it can be outfoxed or outmaneu-
vered. Insider knowledge, energy, and skill can be used to bend it to
their needs. Carol was one such client. Employed for years as a paralegal
before a job layoff led to homelessness and then welfare, Carol transferred
her knowledge of the law and legal systems to the welfare center. Sanctioned
repeatedly by the agency for failing to comply with the work rules, Carol
played the game so well that when she walked into the hearing room,
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the agency representative would routinely agree to settle the case in her
favor.
It had become so repetitious that the third time, the third time or the fourth
time when I walked into the hearing it was like, I know the hearing
examiner now. No really, it’s like, you know, I don’t get into a debate
with the person—with the representative from social services because I
know her as well. You know and she has a big stack of papers and she
says “you know, right, what’s your story?” You know recorder off whatever,
what’s your story. And she goes out and she makes a call she comes back
she says “alright forget it, we don’t even have to go through with this.”
According to Carol, she is treated less like a welfare client than an
experienced and respected negotiator. She is familiar with all of the players
(“I know the hearing examiner. . . . the representative from social services
because I know her well”), and is treated credibly and respectfully by her
adversaries: She “doesn’t get into a debate with them,” they just turn the
recorder off (all hearings are taped), ask her for “her story,” and then settle
it. She attributes her wins not to knowledge of the law but to common
sense: “I’ve won every fair hearing, you know it’s solely based on how much
knowledge you have. Not how much knowledge you have in regards to the
program, but just it’s common sense.” In other words it’s her tactical skills,
not substantive knowledge, which explains her success.
Carol’s ability to level the playing field was unusual. While other clients
also portrayed hearings as skirmishes in a game, most were not as successful.
Linda was one such example. She depicted herself, and other clients, as
insiders who know the rules of the game. As she explained, workers “can’t
break the guidelines,” because “they’ll get reprimanded” but that:
Most people who get on social services, not a lot of them, but most
people who get on social services already know what they’re dealing
with, what the guidelines are, what they’re entitled to. If they find a
loophole somewhere in that guideline, maybe they’re entitled to more,
and if you find out you’re entitled to more than what you’ve been getting,
you can take them to a fair hearing and you can get more.
Linda described fair hearings as a powerful tool: “It gives you a voice. It
does give you a voice.” Revealing her game strategy, she explained that she
never notified the agency she was appealing “because why would I give them
a chance to dig up a case on me?” But Linda was always outwitted and lost
every hearing. She wasn’t sure that she would ask for another one and hadn’t
appealed her most recent sanction. If she did, she was “gonna have my cards
more stacked up before I just take them.” Thus, Linda knew she was being
outmaneuvered, and the game strategy was wearing thin. Her search for
loopholes appeared more a hope than a reality.




Several clients, while incorporating aspects of game strategy, used fair
hearings in a deeper, more subversive way. They “stood against the law” looking
for ways to resist it (Ewick and Sibley 1998, 165). In a bureaucracy, this
may involve turning the tables and invoking the bureaucracy’s own rules
against itself by vigilantly monitoring its actions and highlighting its failings.
Barbara typifies such a client, requesting fair hearings when she thought
the agency wasn’t following its own rules or wasn’t sufficiently attuned to
her needs. She challenged both the agency’s rules and the agency’s discretion.
Thus, she challenged the amount she was required to pay toward emergency
shelter, the agency’s failure to pay the storage fees for her belongings when
she was in the shelter, and the agency’s decision to move her to a shelter
far from her job. When the agency moved too slowly in complying with a
favorable decision, she brandished it before her workers, threatening “to sue”
again if they didn’t comply. Barbara clearly relished putting the agency on
the defensive.
However, Barbara did not use hearings to challenge her many work
sanctions. While she firmly believed the agency wrongfully sanctioned her
for not attending a work meeting because her son was ill, and even filed
for a fair hearing, she decided not to go, because she thought she had no
chance of winning. Explaining that she didn’t have a doctor’s note to prove
her son’s illness because he wasn’t ill enough, nor did she have the money
to take him to the doctor, she “just got discouraged because I was like, well,
I didn’t have no excuse, your kid could be dying, and they wouldn’t care,
you know.”
To Barbara, hearings were a selectively employed tactical tool primarily
useful for challenging those rules that did not implicate her behavior or moral
worth. Viewed by the agency as a bad parent and a bad worker, she laid
low and “lumped it” when she was sanctioned for work rule violations. She
was convinced she could never marshal the proof needed to overcome the
agency’s negative judgments. But when she could turn the agency’s rules on
them, and expose their errors instead of her own, she fought back. Thus,
Barbara carefully calculated her chances of winning before requesting a fair
hearing, firmly drawing a line at those offenses where her behavior was suspect
and the bar of proof too high. She looked for spaces of resistance within
the rules, finding them only when she could shift the focus to the agency’s
behavior instead of her own. To protect herself, and typical of other clients
interviewed, Barbara both resisted and retreated, using fair hearings offensively,
but never defensively, and calling the agency to account only when there
would be no accounting of her actions.
In sum, appealing served varied interests for clients. It was a form of
resistance and a way to challenge power. It was an act of self-assertion or
a display of prowess. However, as described next, more often than not, the
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actual fair hearing experience was often far different from what clients
anticipated.
 
IN THE HEARING ROOM
 
Hearings took place in a small ordinary room within the welfare center.
The room had none of the physical flourishes or embellishments that
signal the solemnity of the law or justice in a courtroom. The parties sat
around a table, with the hearing officer at the head, and the client and a
representative of the agency flanking him or her on either side. The only
physical manifestation of any formality was a tape recorder placed on the
table, used to record the hearing. The worker who made the decision was
not routinely present; instead an agency representative, assigned full-time
to hearings, presented the evidence and questioned the client.
The hearings followed the prescriptions of procedural due process. The
hearing officer was designated by the state as a neutral independent
decisionmaker who was not involved in the original decision. Both the agency
representative and client were entitled to present evidence, oral and written,
and to confront each other. Formal rules of evidence applied, albeit loosely.
(For example, certain evidence, such as hearsay, not admissible in court was
permitted.) However, despite these trappings, hearings followed a bureaucratic
logic or rigidity that diminished these procedural protections and left clients




Procedural due process commands a neutral and unbiased decision maker.
The decision maker in the fair hearing system is the state agency, which
provides regulatory and supervisory oversight over local county agencies that
administer the program and provide aid to individual clients. Thus, although
the state and local welfare agencies are distinct entities, they are intertwined.
While the state, and, by extension, the hearing officer, are not the officials
who makes the initial individual case decisions, they promulgate the laws
and administrative directives that the local agency must follow.
To many clients, the difference between the state and local agency was
a difference without distinction. Pam complained that “it was just all social
services, there’s nobody there outside of social services. No D.A., no District
Attorney for the State of New York or nothing like that, it’s just all Department
of Social Services that does the fair hearing, which is not right.” She referred




 from the DSS from upstate New York”
(where the state agency has its office), thus rejecting any semblance of
neutrality (emphasis supplied). Laura echoed her complaint: “I still can’t
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believe the judge is, is impartial. He don’t come from the streets like us, he
comes from the state. He works for the state. You can tell he’s not really
on our side.” Cindy made it equally as clear that she didn’t think the hearing
officer was unbiased: “Because you’re for social services. You’re not for the
people. So I don’t really know what kind of judge you are, I think you’re
a social services judge, or a state judge, to be able to keep contributions of
the state, in the state.”
As Soss observes, welfare recipients “tend to see government as one
big system” (2005, 323), and the lessons they learn about one part of
government influence how they think about government, and the political
system, in general. Soss was speaking about clients’ broader beliefs about
political participation, but his observation is equally as applicable here. To
Pam and Cindy, there is no distinction between the state and local social
services agencies; they are all social services.
Cindy and Laura make a further distinction: between government and
the governed. The state is not “for the people”; they “are for social services.”
“He doesn’t come from the streets, he comes from the state.” What they mean
is that individual interests are often different than government interests.
The state, as Cindy puts it, wants to “keep contributions in the state.” As she
later clarifies, they “have a quota of people to cut, and a quota of people to
put on.” In other words, the state’s interest in protecting fiscal funds conflicts
with individual citizens’ claims on those funds. Thus, to Cindy and Laura, having
the state social services department hear their claims is inherently biased.
Pam makes another distinction when she complains that there was no
“District Attorney for the State of New York” at the hearing but “just all
the Department of Social Services.” Like Cindy and Laura, she questions
how the same system that cut her benefits can fairly hear her claim. But
unlike Cindy and Laura, she accepts the role of the state in her dispute against
the state. Her choice of the District Attorney, albeit an inappropriate entity
to hear her claim, is revealing. She suggests the separate and independent
state actor whose job is to prosecute wrongdoing by citizens. By placing the
welfare department on equal footing with other individuals who may have
broken the law, she is trying to reduce its power. She cuts it down to size,
calling in law enforcement, the most visible manifestation of government
power, to rule on its actions. Only then would the hearing be fair.
Thus, clients were often suspicious of the state hearing officer, viewing
him or her as an adversary or not neutral. What they observed in the hearing
room further enforced the view, as Barbara put it, that the state “side[s]
together” with the local welfare center. Linda, for example, picked up on
the easy familiarity between the hearing officer and agency representative
when she walked into the hearing room:
They’re calling each other by first names, they’re laughing. I’m nervous,
you know, I’m not in this atmosphere as they are. Honestly, I’m the
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enemy and they’re the—they’re friends. . . . You feel the tension, yeah.
And then when I come in, then they, “alright, we’re here on the case
of Miss R. versus the Department of Soc”—you know and it’s like, oh
I know I’m gonna lose—Because they know each other! I mean, if it’s,
it’s like if you go into a courtroom to defend yourself and you see the
prosecutor and the judge just talking, and they’re laughing and giggling
and stuff, and then when you come in, “alright.”
Clients’ sense of themselves as outsiders, or as Linda dramatically put
it, “the enemy,” was not dispelled by the semiformality of the hearing room.
Linda saw such due process procedures as tape recording as false formalities,
noting that Albany (where the state has its offices) “can’t see beforehand
all their talking, they don’t have a record then.” Pam echoed her concern
that it was all a show: “They were just honoring the fair hearing because
they had to, because I requested it, because they knew they were still gonna
do the same thing no matter what I said.”
The hearing itself often became a forum for interrogating clients, even
though it was the client who had requested the hearing to challenge the
agency’s allegedly wrongful actions. Clients’ motives and actions, not
the welfare agency’s, were suspect. Instead of commanding and refereeing
the hearing, the hearing officer remained a muted presence, or as Carol
described her hearing officer, he was “tired, he’s actually very tired, he’s very
nice, but he’s just tired.” Many clients had no vivid memories of the hearing
officer, in contrast to the agency representative, who loomed large in clients’
recalls of their hearings. Clients’ portrayals of the agency representative were
nearly identical as demonstrated by the following excerpts:
Carol: Just is rude, just out-and-out rude, a really nasty old lady.
Mary: Rude! They were horrible. And if you like, don’t remember, there’s
something wrong with you.
Laura: They get angry there, they get indignant, Social Services, they





have to see it to believe it.
Ann: The hearing rep from Social Service she was a snob, a total—
she was just, she was totally rude, she was just like, she would keep
asking me the same question, like I wasn’t—as if I wasn’t answering,
and I’m still explaining the same thing over and over and over and
over, I’d tell her again and she’d still ask me the same question.
Amy: The social service representative seemed, I don’t know, she seemed
like, I don’t know what’s the word for it, like, “you’re wrong and I’m
right ’cause I’m the state.”
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Thus, many clients experienced hearings as a replay of their interactions
with their caseworkers. The hearing officer’s passivity left the agency free
rein to replicate the silencing and subordination that characterized clients’
daily contact with the agency. They questioned whether their stories were
heard or their actions fairly judged. In short, clients did not perceive hearings
as a neutral forum nor the hearing officer as a neutral decision maker. They
viewed hearings as a gesture without substance, an empty and futile exercise




Documentation, or the reduction of every transaction into a written
form that stands for the actual event, is the sine qua non of bureaucracies
(Miller and Holstein 1996). Writings take on a rarified role in a bureaucracy.
They are imbued with a misplaced objectivity and solidity when in actuality
they are “partisan accounts that express and obscure the interests of those
who construct and use them” (9). Their existence puts clients at a distinct
disadvantage. First, they must overcome this reification of documents, their
status as unassailable fact. Then clients must be able to gather their own
written and credible version of events.
Most clients learned early on that paper was the coin of the bureaucracy
and that the existence or absence of a particular paper could have disastrous
consequences. They often constructed parallel files at home and hoarded
them as a talisman. Ellen kept every notice she was sent about the work
rules, explaining, “I’ve got so much paper that I hold onto so they can’t get
me.” Alice protected herself from claims she didn’t submit the right
documentation by making a copy of everything she sent to the agency. When
the agency failed to provide her with the proper instructions on how to handle
her utility bill, Mary brought down her entire folder to the agency as proof: “And
you saw how organized I was, lady. I had this whole folder, with everything.
I said, ‘Ok you tell me, where’s the paper that I’m supposed to have.’ ”
Most clients however were unprepared for hearings and reacted almost
viscerally to the sheer weight of bureaucratic paperwork at hearings. As Linda




file with all, and they just have





supplied). Despite their efforts, clients, unlike workers, are not used to
documenting every interaction. They also have less access to the types of proof
that are valued. Clients also virtually always are held to a higher standard
of credibility; they are assumed wrong and the agency assumed right. As Katie
describes, “they [the agency] can have nothing either, but they’ll take their
words over yours.” Proving the agency is wrong is extremely difficult. As
Laura described it, “that’s almost like suing a doctor . . . that’s pretty hard
to say the agency did wrong.”
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Ann’s fair hearing case is illustrative. Ann was sanctioned when a worker




Ann knew it was a case of mistaken identity, because the worker told the
agency that Ann’s excuse for not attending was that she had to take a medical
assistant’s test. But Ann, who was a certified nursing assistant, was never
enrolled in a medical assistant program and hence had no such test to take.
The job site worker even admitted she may have confused clients, telling
Ann “I get so many different girls . . . I get so many different girls, um I didn’t
know who was who.” At the hearing, the agency submitted a written summary
of the agency’s conversation with this same job site worker indicating Ann
had been absent. Ann tries to argue, unsuccessfully, with the fair hearing
representative that her report of her conversation with the job site worker
is as acceptable as the agency’s:
She [the fair hearing representative] said something to me about what
the lady at, at the center said to her. I said well, “how do you know
that that’s a true statement? How do you know she was talking about
me? Just like, if I said to you that she told me something, you’re telling
me that she told you something, okay, but what she told you you’re
believing, why wouldn’t it be possible for her to tell me something also.”
(Agency representative): “
 
Well you don’t have that in writing
 
” (emphasis
supplied). “She didn’t give you anything in writing either. You wrote
down what she said. . . .” And I said “Well, if I would have—if I would
have wrote it down, what she said to me, would that have been evidence?”
By asking “If I would have wrote it down what she said to me, would
that have been evidence,” Ann is arguing that her word is as good as the
agency; the only distinction is that one is written and the other verbal. But
the evidence Ann and the agency representative can produce are not equal.
Unlike Ann’s verbal account, the agency’s version was written and preserved
in a bureaucratic file, transforming a questionable account into objective fact
that Ann could not counter with her words. Even if Ann created her own
written record of her conversation with the job site worker, it would still
not equal the agency’s. It is not the official bureaucratically produced version,
it is only Ann’s.
Ann also did not have access to the same proof as the agency. Ann
was not able to demand from the job site worker that she put into writing
her verbal admission; the worker refused to do it. It would have required
her to contradict the earlier version she had provided to the agency and
would be a serious breach of established bureaucratic pathways for constructing
the facts. The job site worker and the agency, without Ann’s input, had
already constructed the agency’s version of the events. Although the case
 
10. To comply with the work rules, clients who do not have private sector jobs are assigned
to various public and private nonprofit agencies, where they work off their grant.
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was about her, Ann was treated as an interloper operating outside established
agency channels.
The agency’s resistance to altering their established truth persisted even
when Ann pointed out that her own case file contained corroboration of
her version. As she explained, if she had been enrolled in a medical assistant
class, it would have been paid for by the agency and hence recorded in her
case record. If there were no such record in the file, it would confirm that
the worker had confused her with another client. However, the agency had
no reason to search their own records for any inconsistencies or proof that
would refute the official and established version of the facts. To do so would
only expose the unreliability of their own records and the fallibility of the
bureaucratic process that constructed them. It was up to Ann, not the agency,
to prove their mistake, which she was ill equipped to do.
Some clients, like Mary, had a different, but related problem, with proof.
For them it was hard translating the facts of everyday life into a form of
proof acceptable to the bureaucracy. Mary had worked for seventeen years
doing secretarial work at an oil company but was now unable to work more
than three hours a day because of a herniated disc and other medical
problems. She viewed herself as willing, but unable, to work: “You know I’d
love to work full-time again. I don’t have a baby at home no more. . . . I
could do whatever I want. I don’t want to stay home 24/7 either.” But the
agency determined that she was not disabled and was able to fully comply
with the work rules. Since her doctor had confirmed her disability to the
agency, she was mystified when they told her she didn’t have the proper
notes. “They said I have nothing new. I said ‘well I really didn’t think I
needed anything new.’ I said ‘you see all my limitations, you know.’ ”
Mary’s belief that she “didn’t think I needed anything new” and that
the “agency could see all my limitations” convinced her that she didn’t even
need a lawyer at her hearing: “I thought I had enough paperwork. . . .
Doctor’s, MRI’s, doctor’s letters stating that I had a herniated disc.” At the
hearing she is confronted by a skeptical agency representative:
I mean I felt like she was, just intimidating me, like telling me I was
a liar. In other words, yes, I came home I said, “I just got called a liar”
—what am I, a liar?! What is this, you know? I said, “I’m telling you
the truth, I’m telling you what I know, and who I am and what is going on.”
She pleads with the agency to tell her what she is missing:
What else do you want from me? What do you want? Somebody tell
me, what kind of paperwork? . . . Or tell me more of what I need to
make this work, you know, what can give me actually a fair hearing?
’Cause I didn’t have no fair hearing, I’m sorry, I didn’t feel I did. Tell
me what I need to have more of a fair hearing. You know, how much
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more paperwork—or send me proper paperwork that will answer your
questions.
Mary later discovers, after she lost the fair hearing, the “proper paperwork”:
Like I did this time, they got me decent papers, the doctor had to fill
out exactly everything what I can do. And I think this is gonna help
because like, social services will send you paperwork? Limitations, now
I’m gonna write them down. That’s all they ask for is for you to write
them down. And um, I wrote ’em down, and now this time the doctor
wrote everything and he wrote the same answers, so this should help.
Okay, but now why didn’t you tell me, why couldn’t I have done that?
Mary begins the process by believing her workers can “see all my limitations.”
To her, the facts of her life are in plain sight and she doesn’t need a lawyer
to explain them. She is shocked at the hearing that she is not believed,
that her doctor’s note confirming her medical problems and her own description
is not enough. She is telling them the “truth”: “I’m telling you what I know,
and who I am and what is going on.” She experiences the agency’s skepticism
as a personal attack: “I was called a liar.” She realizes she is going about it
all wrong, and that what she needs is the right “paperwork.” She gets some
“decent papers” from the same doctor who provided her with the note but
which now invokes the exact and precise bureaucratic language required:
“limitations.” Her everyday meaning of the word “limitations” was now
transposed into its technical, bureaucratic definition. Mary’s disability has
not changed, but the manner in which she describes it has. She had learned
to speak the language of the bureaucracy rather than her own.
Fitting their stories into the narrow and legalistic culture of the bureaucracy
was a common problem for clients. The laws that govern aid are often
reductive and rigid. Under welfare reform, these simplistic rules are now
routinely used to evaluate and monitor clients’ behavior and worthiness. Not
only are the rules too blunt and rough to judge behavior, they also permit
judgments based on only a slice of it. A single missed appointment among
the many appointments clients attend could result in the denial of aid. Thus,
not surprisingly, clients who ran afoul of the rules and knew their worthiness
as clients was being judged, saw hearings as an opportunity to prove their
worth. This meant telling a different story than the hearing officer wanted
to hear. In short, hearing officers and clients often had a different definition
of relevancy.
This is illustrated by Cindy, who had been denied aid because she failed
to attend a Front End Detection System (FEDS) appointment, required by
the agency to detect and prevent fraud. Recently released from the hospital
after stomach surgery, Cindy’s FEDS appointment conflicted with a doctor’s
appointment to get her surgery staples removed. Although she called and
rescheduled the FEDS appointment for the next day, when she came for
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her appointment, she was told she was sanctioned for missing the appointment
the day before. At her hearing appealing this determination, Cindy knows
that underlying the decision is the agency’s view that she is irresponsible. She
tries to explain why she is a “good” client but is cut off by the hearing officer:
He just said “keep it simple.” I guess my answers were too long. Because
I wanted him to really understand why, it wasn’t like I’m just this couch
potato that does not feel like—I’m not responsible. I mean even before
this if you go—and I said to him, I even have papers of that, I said
“if you go back, I’ve been off of social services. I went back to work
and the whole bit. I went to school through social services and so on
and so forth. I was able to support my family but then I became ill.
Um, I had an operation.” And he said, “can you keep it simple?” And
I said, “But I’m trying to explain to you how this even all came about.”
Cindy describes what keeping it simple means: “very blunt answers,
either yes you made the appointment, no you did not make the appointment,
well why didn’t you make the appointment?” She responds:
I had an operation, I’m still ill right now. . . . I couldn’t come because
I had to have staples removed. He said to me, “and you couldn’t change
that appointment?” I said, “Would you?” And then he just said, “Okay,
that’ll be it.” I said, “You don’t need anything?” “No.”
Cindy wants to be judged by the whole of her life, not the single missed
appointment. When she says “I’m trying to explain to you how this even
all came about,” she means her becoming a welfare recipient, not just the
missed appointment. She knows her status as a welfare client implicates her
moral worth. Thus, Cindy wants the hearing officer to know that she is not
a “couch potato” but a responsible person who went to school, worked, and
raised a family until she became ill. But the hearing officer cuts her off, tells
her “to keep it simple.” Instead he focuses on whether she could have changed
the appointment.
As White describes, the bureaucratization of welfare means underlying
assumptions and values “have been ‘legalized’, or reformulated as systems of
explicit rules and values have been translated into a uniform currency or
‘monetized’ ” (1990, 40). This reformulation is reductive; it leaves no room
for the values and judgments underlying the rules. Cindy knows she is being
judged by these larger values, but the rules prevent her from addressing them.
She knows that at stake is more than her willingness to change her appointment,
and that underlying the hearing officer’s question are assumptions and
stereotypes about Cindy as a welfare client. But the hearing room is not a
place where Cindy can speak to this.
As Conley and Barr (1990) have found, relational testimony, such as
Cindy’s, which emphasizes the social rather than the legal, is more common
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among women, minorities, and the poor. The powerless and the victimized
will look for an authoritative and understanding listener who will recognize
the seriousness of their problem and use the law to right it. Since such clients
are appealing to broader notions of need and justice, their accounts are
similarly broad. To locate their problem in the larger world, they include
the details of that world, including the extralegal. Under welfare reform,
this need has grown even greater as clients’ behaviors, rather than need,
have become the welfare bureaucracy’s central focus. The law, implicitly
and explicitly, assumes welfare recipients are lazy and irresponsible. Thus,
for clients, proving their moral worth and challenging the deeply rooted nega-
tive assumptions that construct the law are crucial and relevant. But while
the procedural dictates of due process include the opportunity to be heard,
this opportunity is as constricted as the law itself. Clients can address only





Our political and legal culture celebrates notions such as due process
and procedural justice. The “opportunity to be heard” has an almost
sacrosanct and hallowed timbre; it implies all have an opportunity to
participate in the legal and political institutions that govern our lives. For




 and its requirement
of pretermination hearings was supposed to ensure their participation in the
welfare bureaucracy, arguably the most significant government institution in
their lives.





an ill-fitting vessel for many welfare recipients. While standards of proof are
technically the same for both agency and clients, clients are often presumed
less credible. Most welfare recipients do not have the power to command
the proof they need. They are often outmatched by their opponents, who,
by the force and velocity of their questions, can quickly transform the hearing
into an interrogation. The stories clients want to tell are not the ones hearing
officers want to hear. The language clients speak is at odds with the language
of law.
Despite this, some clients persevere, and ask for hearings. Like many
citizens, they are as concerned with being heard by their governmental
institutions as they are with the outcome of their case (Tyler 2006). Shut
out below, they hope to find within the machinery of government a forum
where they can obtain recompense and respect. They know the odds are
against them, and that the law will not rescue them, but they also know
that “the discourse of need and rules occur on law’s terrain” (Sarat 1990,
374). Clients use fair hearings to engage, play with, and resist the law, hoping
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that it will protect them from an often arbitrary and capricious bureaucracy.
The law, and fair hearings, is one tool—albeit an imperfect one—that
sometimes can be used to resist the welfare bureaucracy.
Thus, fair hearings can’t simply be dismissed as a useless artifact of the
era of rights, poorly tailored then, and especially unsuitable now, in this era
of welfare reform. Arguably, welfare reform has made fair hearings more, not
less, essential. While subjective notions of worthiness have always influenced
the distribution of aid, welfare reform has more deeply embedded this process
in the law, using legal mechanisms, such as sanctions, to sort the worthy
from the unworthy. Sanctions have enhanced the power of workers, whose
imperfect sorting process rests on both rules and discretion. Fair hearings
provide a forum for challenging decisions that are guided by this uneasy mix
of discretion and rules. It permits closer scrutiny of workers’ often subjective





However, changes are needed for fair hearings to succeed as a forum
where client/citizens are fully and fairly heard. One tempting change is to





, fighting law with law is one way to deal with a bureaucracy
organized around law. Although most of the clients went to their hearing
without a lawyer, they often identified a need for one. Lawyers, they were
convinced, had access to evidentiary proof denied them as clients. They
forced hearing officers and agency representatives to engage more fully in
the facts and law of the case. They knew things clients, even those versed
in the bureaucracy, didn’t know.
But adding more lawyers, while helpful, does not ultimately tackle the
underlying imbalance and fissures in the hearing room between clients and
the hearing officer who judges them and the agency representatives who
question them. Hearing officers and agency representatives are steeped in the
language, social attitudes, and normative practices of the welfare bureaucracy.
It is almost impossible for them to escape it, to step back and listen to and
understand what the client is saying. Hearing officers often also abdicate their
role, letting the agency representative, in essence, conduct the hearing. One





 The tie between the state and local agency could also
be cut by using hearing officers not located within that system. White suggests
that hearing officers should “share the perspective—the social location—
of the claimant, particularly in a context like welfare hearings where the
 
11. Four out of five clients in New York City are successful at hearings challenging the
application of work rules, thus demonstrating that hearings can be a useful tool for challenging
agency decisions (Lens 2005).
12. These, and other changes such as rotating hearing officers to discourage familiarity
with agency representatives, were suggested in a 1999 report by the New York State Bar
Association based on a study of state agency administrative appeal proceedings.
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claimant is likely to come from a marginalized social group” (1990, 55). This
might mean recruiting a different type of hearing officer, outside the state
bureaucracy, including hearing officers that are part of clients’ community
or social class (White 1990).
White also suggests that hearing officers be trained to listen more closely
and deeply to the speech of the powerless and intervene to restate it.
Standards of proof and relevance could also be expanded to incorporate
clients more relational style. Such changes would subtly subvert the hierarchy
of power embedded in the bureaucracy. Instead of clients adapting to the
bureaucracy, it would adapt to clients. This might make the hearing room
a more comfortable and useable space for clients. To be sure it would not
change the rules, nor the values and assumptions about clients underlying
them. But it may provide more spaces within the law for clients to resist
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